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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ Since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 our understanding of Cold War history has changed considerably. The new wave of research, spurred by the opening of archives and opportunities for novel East-West comparisons, threw into sharper relief aspects of the Cold War contest that had previously received little attention. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Cold War was not only a military, political and economic conflict, but one that was profoundly implicated in, and shaped by, key transformations in twentieth century culture. 2 Capitalizing on the increased accessibility of primary sources from former socialist states, recent research also provided valuable insights into the politics of everyday culture on both sides of the Iron Curtain, 3 and we have also seen the publication of several transnational accounts of the cultural Cold War spanning both the West and the East. finally, what aspects of social reality did this discourse obscure, and in what ways did it help shore up or challenge the official identity narratives at the time?
To answer these questions, this paper examines the journalistic discourse about culture in the north-western part of Yugoslavia, which encompasses the eastern side of the upper Adriatic coast and the region bordering Italy. There are several reasons that make this part of Yugoslavia particularly well suited for an investigation into the functioning of Cold War framings of culture. The proximity of Italy, the bilingualism of the local population, and the presence of ethnic minorities on both sides -Italians in Yugoslavia and Slovenians in Italyencouraged constant cross-border exchanges and obstructed the processes of cultural homogenization and nation-building on each side of the border. Italian radio and later television were immensely popular with the local Yugoslav audiences, and from the 1960s onwards, shopping trips to Italy became a regular feature of everyday life. 16 At the same time, many Italians and Slovenian minority members living in Italy became regular customers of Yugoslav restaurants and petrol stations, followed the radio and television broadcasts from Yugoslavia, and also formed a substantial proportion of foreign tourists visiting the Yugoslav coastal resorts. Due to these multiple cross-border ties, the region served both as a meeting point and as a battleground for competing conceptions of culture, identity and everyday life, promoted by cultural producers on both sides of the border.
Cold War Culture in the North-western Yugoslavia
To understand the full scope of these exchanges and tensions we need to keep in mind that this region forms part of the symbolic fracture that cuts the European continent, in the eyes of Western Europeans, into its civilized Western and underdeveloped Eastern or Balkan part.
First formed in the period of Venetian Enlightenment, 17 this symbolic fracture was subsequently remolded to suit the legitimating strategies and identity narratives promoted by the successive administrations in the region, including the Habsburg Empire, the Kingdom of Italy and Nazi Germany. After World War II, the older mental mappings became enmeshed with Cold War binaries, and were selectively appropriated to suit new political agendas, this time shaped by the global contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. 18 Since the spreading of nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century, the successive changes of administration in the region were also accompanied by more or less violent forms of cultural homogenisation. The rise of fascism in Italy gave way to increasingly ruthless forms of
Italianization of Slovenians and Croatians in the region, which in turn prompted a hardening of anti-Italian sentiments and gave rise to clandestine antifascist organizations that regularly resorted to violent means. 
The Journalistic Discourse about Culture
As evident from the discussion so far, this paper is concerned primarily with public discourse about culture rather than the cultural events, products or policies on themselves. In particular, it examines the normative understanding of culture promoted by the media, the distinctions and categories it relies upon, and analyzes the ways in which the press engaged with different cultural forms, including serialized novels, popular music and television series. The analysis also pays attention to the different uses of the key discursive distinctions and categories, focusing on their application in the negotiation of Yugoslav identity and culture. To asses the epistemic effects of these discursive strategies, the paper interprets them in relation to It is important to clarify the limitations imposed by the nature of primary sources used.
Especially in the early post-war years, the press largely reflected official views and did not exert an independent influence on cultural processes. 21 This was also a period when the literacy rates were relatively low and local resistance to communist policies fairly widespread. 22 Therefore, it may well be that the framing of culture promoted by the press was largely ignored by the wider population. Accepting this proposition, however, would mean confusing influence with approval; while the socialist Yugoslav press certainly cannot be taken as an accurate expression of public culture as a whole, it nevertheless played a major role in delineating the boundaries of what was publicly acceptable, and imposing 'a structure of thinking' even among those who did not support the regime. 23 Finally, taking into account the role of the media becomes even more important when examining the developments after
Tito's split with Stalin in 1948 and in particular after the changes to cultural policies initiated in the early 1950s. In this period, the relative balance of power between the Party, the state, the market and the media shifted towards the latter, and the media became much more active players in the shaping of Yugoslav culture.
Uplifting the working masses
Throughout the first period examined in the paper, the border between Italy and Yugoslavia remained in flux. As the Cold War rivalry began to take shape, the territorial dispute between the two neighboring states assumed a strategically important geopolitical role, and became a a. Culture as an instrument of progress and education. To start with, culture was seen primarily as an instrument of progress and education rather than entertainment or leisure, and was to be aimed at the working classes. This understanding of culture came very clearly to the fore in articles aimed at mobilizing the local population for extended bouts of concentrated production known as 'shockwork' and for competitions between local factories and other organizations that were expected to boost productivity. 36 Articles dedicated to shockwork and competition, typically written by local CPY leaders or left unsigned, were a common sight in the newspapers, and often appeared on the first few pages. As one such article explained, cultural activities formed an integral part of the process of 'ideological elevation', which would also help speed up the industrialization of the country and help construct a 'new Yugoslavia'. The article expressed concern at the lack of attention paid by the local labor union organization to the cultural aspects of the competition, and called for more effort to be invested in organizing literacy classes and simulating entry into education. 37
In a similar vein, another article criticized the cultural activities accompanied the competitions organized by the labor unions for putting too much emphasis on entertainment.
staging too many 'light' plays, and supplying local libraries with sentimental novels instead of promoting culture that would help recruit volunteers for shockwork and the youth labor brigades. Both leisure and entertainment were considered legitimate and necessary, yet the key task of Yugoslav cultural manifestations lay elsewhere:
they should inculcate seriousness of life needed for the construction of the new state, they should teach the people/nation [popolo] to take pride in work, to take pride in bringing one's own contribution to the creation of a common future'.
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A report intent on exposing the drawbacks of cultural and educational activities in the region was even more prescriptive, arguing that far too little effort was invested into cultural activities that would support the Yugoslav economy, and that more should be done to set up cultural events aimed at promoting participation in agricultural and other activities laid out in the five year plan. 39 The emphasis on the role of culture as a tool of socialist mobilization and progress also played a key role in the selection of various fictional and semi-fictional cultural forms published in the same newspapers. For instance, the protagonists of short stories, serialized novels and comic dialogues were most often model socialist workers or peasants, involved in a revolutionary battle or in heroic re-building of their war-torn society. insisted that illiteracy should be erased from Tito's Yugoslavia, 'since it is only in this way that we will be able to build the country and make it cultured and progressive'. 44 Or, as one Another element of continuity can be found in the appropriation of older cultural forms, embedded in nineteenth-century projects of nation-building and education. A good case in point is provided by the comic dialogues between Franina and Jurina, appearing on the pages of the Croatian language newspaper Glas Istre. The protagonists of these dialogues were always the same: two Istrian peasants talking in the local dialect, known from the Croatianlanguage almanacs that played an important role in Croatian nation-building in the region.
One was somewhat more ignorant than the other, and provided a convenient target for mild ridicule as well as education. In each episode of the dialogue, the better-informed protagonist would talk to his friend about an important event or issue and criticize him for knowing so little about it. In all cases, the events and issues discussed were taken from the Party's agenda for that week or day, and included for instance the five year plan and the Yugoslav state budget, the building of the new railway system, and the 30th anniversary of the October The contrast between ideological emptiness and progressive substance was also used to demarcate the 'new' Yugoslav culture in spatial, geo-cultural terms. The exemplary models of cultural products and activities that paid due attention to 'substance' were often found in the Soviet Union, while negative examples of 'formalistic' culture were associated with 'the West'. In an article about Soviet culture translated from the Soviet daily Pravda, Western culture and civilization were described as 'superficial', hiding a 'spiritual poverty of contemporary imperialists and their followers'. In contrast, Soviet culture allegedly 'arose from and blossoms on the basis of a genuine democracy, brotherly friendship of equal nations', and now 'provides the rallying point for all the progressive forces of the world'. Not all of the cultural products and activities at the time, however, were equally successful at attracting mass participation, and much of the reporting was dedicated to criticizing particular events and activities for failing to live up to the new cultural ideals. For example, an article evaluating the cultural-educational activities in the city of Rijeka and its surroundings criticized the organizers for their failure to establish strong ties with mass organizations and achieve greater popular appeal. 61 Apart from that, mass appeal also played a key role in distinguishing it from Italian and more broadly 'Western' culture, as well as from the culture of Fascist Italy. While the articles acknowledged that Italian culture is highly developed, they were also pointing out that the ability to appreciate and enjoy it was limited to the wealthy, . 65 Yet while acknowledging that the ideas about the desirable content of culture in the East and West differed, we should also keep in mind that being able to provide culture for the masses was a goal pursued by intellectuals on both sides of Cold War divide. 66 Modern means of mass communication were believed to provide particularly powerful instruments of cultural development and modernization. For many American social scientists and UNESCO officials at the time, the media were 'great multipliers', capable of increasing the amount of information people can send and receive, and thereby speeding up processes of change in even the most remote backwaters of the world. 67 The habit of assessing development by means of quantitatively measuring the proliferation of mass culture was also not unique to the Eastern block. Literacy rates, newspaper circulation and radio receivers per capita were all indicators widely adopted in post-war American studies of modernization and development. 68 Given the shared history of 'culture counting' -a practice that became widespread across Europe by the mid-nineteenth century 69 -this structural similarity is hardly surprising, and is one of the features that attest to the shared roots of the understanding of culture on both sides of the Cold War divide.
Another shared feature, prominent especially in the early post-war years, was the disdain for genuinely popular cultural forms. Despite the constant promotion of culture and art inspired by the needs of 'the working masses', Yugoslav commentators were dismissive of cultural forms actually enjoyed by the same 'masses'. Jazz and modern dance, they argued, will instill idleness and promote worldly pleasures instead of mobilizing the population for the construction of socialism. Ironically, in a country that prided itself on being genuinely popular, owned and ruled by 'the people', popular cultural preferences did not seem to matter. In one article, jazz was described as 'hysterical', 70 while another described 'boogiewoogie' as a phenomenon that clearly 'has nothing to do with culture'. 71 These anxieties were shared by Soviet Party officials, who were constantly concerned about the vulnerability of the Russian people to various cultural seductions and deviations orchestrated by the capitalist world. 72 Similarly as the inclination to associate the proliferation of mass culture with development and progress, such fears were far from being specific to the Eastern block.
The popularity of American movies, music, and dances among young East and West
Germans in the early 1950s provoked strikingly similar responses in both Germanies, causing anxiety over the oversexualization of women and feminization of men purportedly stimulated by these cultural forms. 73 Feeding on pre-existing cultural fears of mass society, consumerism and modernity, such anxieties constituted another key thread shared by early Cold War cultural policies and discourses about culture in both the East and the West.
By obscuring these fundamental similarities and continuities, the early Cold War discourse about Yugoslav culture in the region helped sustain the belief in the uniqueness and superiority of the socialist system vis-à-vis the political, economic and cultural structures of the past, as well as those implemented in the West, and thereby helped prevent systematic comparisons that could have challenged the legitimacy of the Yugoslav regime at the time. 70 Sequi, 'Per la nuova cultura', p. Changes taking place in the realm of cultural policies followed a similar logic. Already in 1949, the CPY leadership came to the conclusion that the old cultural policies, aimed at changing popular consciousness with the help of 'administrative means', were misguided.
Instead, they argued for a less intrusive and prescriptive approach to culture, and for greater ideological pluralism.
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In the aftermath of these shifts within political leadership, new tropes entered the Yugoslav public discourse, organized around slogans such as 'debureaucratization', 'decentralization', and of course 'workers' self-management'. 78 Influenced by broader changes in the realm of culture, politics and economy, the Yugoslav media system also started undergoing a significant transformation, although major changes took place only in the 1960. This was a period when liberal-minded party leaders were gaining ground across Yugoslavia, and were pushing for further market reforms modeled on the West and for greater intellectual and religious freedoms. 89 The principles of selfmanagement were finally being translated into legislative changes that allowed the media to elect their top management, which increased their organizational independence and 91 At the same time, as a result of economic reforms, financial independence of publishing houses and broadcasting organizations increased as well: direct state funding decreased sharply, taxation levels were dropped, broadcasting organizations were allowed to set subscription fees based on service costs, and acquired control over 70% of their total profits. Advertising revenues began constituting an increasingly significant proportion of revenue, even in the broadcasting sector. 92 The financial independence of publishing houses and broadcasting organizations increased as well, and so did the incentives to maximize profits, for instance by opening the pages of daily newspapers to entertainment and by publishing special interest weekly magazines dedicated to sports, fashion, television and film and the like. Circulation numbers from the period speak for themselves: while the total circulation of newspapers -in part affected also by the rising popularity of radio and television -decreased from 10.06 millions in 1964 to 8.67 in 1970, the total circulation of magazines increased from 3.8 million to 8.24 million in the same period.
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The 1960s were also marked by a strengthening of nationalist antagonisms in the federation. facilitated by the decentralization of the media system in this period. 95 Subjected to republican rather than federal control, the separate republican media systems were increasingly functioning as proto-national media systems, aimed at first at the different national 'imagined communities', 96 and only then at the wider Yugoslav community. Cultural policies aimed at creating an integrated Yugoslav culture were abandoned, heated exchanges over 'unitarism' were becoming more and more common, and were paralleled by the rising prominence of nationalist ideas in educational and linguistic policies, and increasing divergence of the history and literary curricula taught in each of the republics. 97 Ultimately, the alliance between liberal reformers and nationalist leaders proved deadly for both. By the end of 1971, it was clear that federal authorities were gearing up for a thorough purge of both liberals and nationalists from all major political and cultural institutions, and by the end of 1972, virtually all the leaders of liberal reforms that marked the late 1960s have disappeared from public light.
These developments inevitably had an impact on the Yugoslav press examined in this paper, both in terms of its institutional arrangements as well as with regard to its form and content.
Most newspapers have adopted a new (smaller) format, and introduced several new rubrics aimed primarily at attracting additional readers. Novi list (previously entitled Riječki list) and
Glas Istre introduced an equivalent of the 'Page Three Girl' on their back pages, and
Primorski Dnevnik took every opportunity to include a photo of a half-naked popular singer or actress, making the visual layout of these newspapers strikingly different from the one characteristic of the late 1940s (Figures 1 and 2) was now a regular feature, and included half-page adverts for Coca-Cola and several adverts for various shops in the nearby Italian towns and cities. Yugoslav nations. Culture was seen as an organic entity tied to the national body, destined to serve as an instrument of both national integration and national preservation. Reviews of cultural events were frequently suffused with organicist metaphors known from nineteenthcentury national romanticism. An article published in the Croatian language daily Novi list thus described Croatian poetry as 'an organic, indivisible whole', which encompasses 'everything that was ever written in Croatian language from the first known beginnings of poetry to today'. 99 Another article insisted that local radio stations should broadcast traditional music from various Croatian regions, and argued that this will lead 'to an even tighter integration into a unified entity'. 100 Reports and commentaries found in Slovenianlanguage newspapers were no different in this respect. One report, written by a commentator specializing in music, referred to a well-known Slovenian coir as 'the voice of the nation and its pride', and described its singing as 'growing from the nation and for the nation'. should be kept where they belong, that is, behind a microphone and in front of an orchestra, and not on a political stage'. 110 In a curious twist of argument, the idea of popular culture as apolitical was used to defend a singer whose work had unambiguous political repercussions.
The normative expectations about form and content outlined here rarely served to explicitly position 'our' culture in geopolitical and historical terms, and were instead, just as the notion of culture as a means of national preservation, used primarily to delineate the internal hierarchies of 'our' culture. It is also important to note that the multitude of normative views about the relative importance of form and content in judging culture was evidently underpinned by fundamental disagreements, which constitute yet another aspect that makes the 1971 journalistic discourse about culture very different from the discourse in 1947. Later in the same year, this ambiguity was at least temporary reduced by means of political purges.
Among other things, Vice Vukov was branded a Croatian nationalist and remained abroad for several years due to fear of persecution, while Mandić was barred from publishing for a whole decade. These developments suggest that the attempt to divorce culture from politics had its limits -it was acceptable as long as the culture in question was not in any direct way challenging the legitimacy of Yugoslav 'brotherhood and unity'.
c. Between entertainment and education, between 'trash culture' and elitism. The disdain for popular culture and the emphasis on culture as a means of ideological elevation were far less prominent in 1971 than they were in 1947. Instead, reporters were now accepting the existence of differences between elite and popular cultural tastes as a given and relatively rarely linked culture specifically to workers. The range of cultural forms discussed and incorporated into newspapers itself attests to this change of attitudes. Serialized novels written in the tradition of socialist realism were now nowhere to be found, and were most Ljubljana received lengthy coverage and was described as a cultural event with 'a rich program' and 'an established reputation'. 112 News about American, but also Italian, French and English films and music, often accompanied by glamorous photos of famous actors and singers, were appearing on a regular basis, and often received sympathetic coverage. 113 Newspapers were full of admiration for popular songs, concerts and festivals that would earlier be dismissed as worthless and excessively idealistic, including foreign spectacles such as the Sanremo Music Festival. 114 The domestic popular music industry had taken root as well, and reports attested to the great popularity of Yugoslav groups and singers, including for instance the Croatian singer Ivo Robič, both at home and abroad. 115 To be sure, in 1971, none of this can be considered new. The proliferation of popular entertainment was a notable trend already in the 1950s and provoked concern among the members of the LCY and the SAWP ever since. Yet as explained earlier, this trend became far more pronounced in the 1960s and the early 1970s.
Not everyone, of course, was equally enthusiastic about the proliferation of entertainment culture in Yugoslavia. The tabloid-style coverage of (mostly Western) popular culture was itself conveying a rather mixed message: articles about celebrities were frequently interspersed with stories about unhappy private lives, hints to links with criminal or immoral activity, or simply plain weirdness. Most importantly, the Western pop icons were all presented as unmistakably foreign: as attention-grabbing and entertaining pieces in the mosaic of the 'colorful world' 116 that was not really our own. As a true object of desire, Western popular culture remained simultaneously fascinating and threatening, and therefore best kept at an arms length: as something to marvel at and enjoy, but never accept as one's own. Also worth noting is that the symbolic map of the world charted by the newspaper coverage of popular culture in north-western Yugoslavia was oriented almost exclusively to the West, while the rest of the world virtually disappeared from sight. Although imperfect and in some ways threatening, the West represented the main object of interest.
The more high-brow segments of press coverage of culture were sending a more unambiguous message about the perils associated with Western popular imports, and popular culture in general. The dangers of 'commercialization' and 'consumerism' were periodically debated among members of the LCY and the various SAWP organs in Croatia at the time, 117 and were also among the key issues discussed at a conference of the Association of CulturalEducational Organizations of Slovenia organized in 1971. 118 'Trash culture' (šund) -a derogative term that encompassed everything from detective and sentimental novels to popular music and comics -was particularly often singled out as the target. In an article announcing an imminent concert by a major Slovenian coir, the commentator described the choir's singing as 'growing from and for the nation', praised it for expressing an awareness of 'one's self [and] of human ties', and contrasted it with the 'consumerist nonsense' of šund.
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As this comment indicates, negative attitudes towards popular culture were not necessarily based on the idea that such culture was ideologically hostile to the socialist system, but rather on the conviction that it was somehow devoid of meaning, and thus of too low quality. 120 This was in tune with views held by some of the leading LCY members; as Josip Broz Tito explained in one of his speeches delivered in the early 1960s, šund was not to be considered as an expression of Western culture, but as something the West itself considers negative.
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While voicing criticisms of popular culture, many commentators were nevertheless eager to demarcate their criticisms from what they saw as unacceptable elitism. Some of the representatives of Slovenian cultural organizations discussing the threats of consumerism were at the same time warning of the danger of 'deviating into an elitist understanding of culture'. In a socialist society, they claimed, there is simply no place for elite culture. 122 In other words, popular culture was seen simultaneously as a threat and a blessing: a threat to established cultural canons, yet at the same time also a welcome shield against the dangers of elitism. As an article about fashion explained, the rise of mass produced, cheap clothing had the capacity to make designer items more easily available to an average consumer, yet on the other hand, it could lead to uniformity and stimulate the consumption of items one does not really need. Instead of siding either with designer fashion or with mass produced clothing, the article leaves the choice to the consumer, who should be perfectly able to avoid both extremes and find an individual path between the two. 123 Similar 'balancing acts' could be found in articles about other forms of culture. As the director of a regional chain of cinemas explained in an interview, the key to the rising number of cinema-goers lied in finding a middle way between the demands of the 'intellectuals' and the cultural preferences of the majority 'to which film represents entertainment, relaxation'. 124 The interviewee also emphasized the cinema's attempt to educate the less demanding cinema-goers by occasionally introducing 'more challenging films', with the aim of 'consciously educating those viewers who do not want to think too much while watching [the film]'. By doing so, the chain of cinemas was in his view able to respond both to the demands of the market and to the demands of film art.
A factor that worked against the wholesale rejection of mass produced artifacts, consumer culture and Western formats was the fact that Yugoslav leaders have learned to exploit the popularity of these cultural forms to their own advantage, and used them to boost their standing abroad as well as to attract popular support at home. An additional aspect that contributed to the acceptance of popular culture in the Yugoslav northwest was the booming tourism industry. In the 1960s alone, the number of foreign visitors to Yugoslavia increased from one to almost five millions per year. 127 Revenues from tourism along the Adriatic coast were mushrooming, and the local population was keen to To put it differently, if the coverage in 1947 was clearly marked by the Cold War confrontation, and oriented towards marking the distinctiveness of Yugoslav culture vis-à-vis its geopolitical and historical others, the coverage in 1971 was oriented primarily to internal struggles and hierarchies. At the same time, the way in which these internal struggles were framed and categorized -exemplified in the use of organicist metaphors and the emphasis on national preservation rather than change -served to present them as natural and rooted in history, thereby obscuring the fact that they were a recent product of changing cultural practices and policies, and of the journalistic discourse itself. Unlike the progress-centered discourse of 1947, which neglected continuities with the past, the discourse of 1971 had the exact opposite effect, namely of obscuring change by presenting it as part of nature and history. It is precisely in this discursive context that the Cold War binaries of East and West would re-enter the language of the Yugoslav mass media in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when they would be used to discursively unravel Yugoslav culture from within by distinguishing between the culturally 'Western' republics of Slovenia and Croatia, and the culturally 'Eastern' or 'Balkan' rest of the country. 130 At that point, the whole of the Yugoslav past emerged as a harmful deviation from the prescribed course of modernization, and as an unnatural, forced marriage of the East and the West.
Conclusions
The conclusions drawn in this paper have important implications for our understanding of the Cold War, especially for any research that aims to unpack the role of discourse, language, ideology and culture in this historical period. First, our analysis suggest that the categories and distinctions used in narrating the cultural history of the Cold War -East and West, class and nation, socialism and capitalism, elite and mass culture etc. -should be approached with caution. Any application of these categories that does not take into account their shifting meanings and practical uses, runs the risk of missing the gap that separated subjective representations from political, economic and social structures they were embedded in and helped sustain. As shown in the paper, the particular discursive uses of Cold War categories and distinctions obscured their own role in creating -rather than merely describing -the realities of Yugoslav culture, and should therefore be subjected to critical scrutiny rather than taken at face value. Such critical investigation of discourse is particularly important when At the same time, we should also resist the temptation of dismissing Cold War discourse as a mere myth that has nothing to do with the everyday realities and concerns at the time, and is hence unworthy of analysis. This would not only miss the constitutive role of discourse in shaping and sustaining Cold War realities, but also invite a rather misleading description of the period, organized around contrasts between myth and reality, official ideology and private narratives, oppression and resistance. Such a description would do little to explain why individual social actors were willing to overlook the mismatch between Cold War discourse and the realities they lived in, and even appropriate elements of this discourse as fully adequate descriptions of their lifeworlds. In addition, a simplistic contrast between myth and reality also runs the risk of ascribing too much weight to discourses that diverged from officially endorsed narratives and categories, and even treat them as somehow more 'real' than official ones. Such an understanding can come uncomfortably close to currently popular accounts of the Cold War, and risks becoming entangled in contemporary political struggles and divided memories of the period.
